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PROCEDURE.-

SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON NON-RESIDENT MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS
The following is a brief version of Virginia Code, Section 2154 (70)i:
The acceptance by a non-resident of the privilege conferred upon
him in permitting him to operate a motor vehicle in this state shall
operate to appoint the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles as his
agent for the service of process, and such service shall have the same
legal effect as service upon his person for acts arising out of the operation of such vehicle - provided that the Director mails to the defendant
by registered mail a copy of the process with registered delivery receipt
requested.
The constitutionality of the statute can no longer be seriously
questioned. (1) The constitutional requirements of notice are met by the
provision that "the Director mail the notice to the defendant by registered mail with return receipt requested. (2) Whether omission of.the
provision requesting a' return receipt" would alter the validity of the
statute has not been fully answered - though one case held that it would
not. The question still open for discussion is "what constitutes a
sufficient compliance with the Statute?" Do the words "to the defendant"
mean that the defendant must actually receivo the notice?
A conservative Georgia Court held that though the Statute was complied
with the Court did not have personal jurisdiction because the notice was
not received by the defendant. (3) The applicable Statute in Georgia
is similar to the Virginia Statute. In effect, the Georgia court held
that the defendant either had to receive the notice, or know that it was
prinin the post office for him. The Court based their decisionion the
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that delivery will be made, service shall be held good." Whether or not
it was probable that the defendant actually received notice in this case
is a somewhat different question from whether or not the Director acted
reasonably in view of the facts before him. The defendant in the case
was the wife of an enlisted man in the Navy. Facts tended to §how
that
she had very little contact with any of the places to which the Director
mailed the notice, She was obviously a transient and inclined to very
little contact with any home ties. The likelihood of her receiving
notice
und6r such circumstances is distinctly different from whether the Director
acted reasonably in view of the information available to him. The
Director did mail a notice to each of the addresses. he could obtain respecting the defendant. Certainly such was reasonable and the best
practicable notice. The defendant did enter a special appearance, indicating that in some way she received notice, but this shopld be immaterial in deciding whether the Statute has been complied with. In effect,
this case holds that if the Director mails the notice to the best available
address or one most likely to reach thc. defendant, service will be held
good. In view of this we do not need to argue about "probability".
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